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SPORTS MEDICINE CONFLICTS: TEAM PHYSICIANS vs.
ATHLETE–PATIENTS

STEVE P. CALANDRILLO*
Abstract: Team physicians for professional sports franchises face a conflict
of interest created by the competing loyalties they owe to the team that
employs them and to the athlete–patient they must treat. Marketing
agreements under which physicians pay significant sums of money to be
designated as the team’s “official healthcare provider” exacerbate this conflict.
These marketing arrangements call into question the independent judgment of
team physicians and cause players to question the quality of care they receive.
This paper explores several solutions to the growing conflicts between athletes
and team doctors with the goal of enhancing players’ trust in the medical care
they receive. First, to remove the dual loyalty problem faced by team
physicians, professional sports leagues or players’ unions should hire medical
providers directly—as opposed to having individual teams employ and provide
them. If this fundamental employment change proves impossible, physician
groups should enter into explicit agreements with sports franchises that assert
the groups’ independence, and professional sports leagues should mandate that
physicians disclose all potential conflicts of interest to the players they treat.
In addition, sports leagues could ban physicians from advertising their
affiliation with teams to alleviate the problem of doctors engaging in bidding
wars to service athletes at below-market rates in order to gain a “PR” edge on
their competition. Finally, states might consider exceptions to the exclusive
remedy provisions of workers’ compensation laws to ensure that professional
athletes have legal recourse when they suffer the deleterious effects of these
conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
Sitting on Bill Stanfill’s mantel is a jar filled with a clear solution and
small ball sitting at the bottom.1 It is the ball of his left hip that was removed
in 2000 as a result of avascular necrosis, a serious medical condition that
occurs when blood circulation to the bone is cut off and the bone dies.2 At 54,
he is not the type of person you expect to see navigating with a walker, but
Stanfill is a former professional football player.3 His hip injury was caused by
repeated trauma and, possibly, repeated cortisone injections while he played
football.4 His other hip will likely require surgery in the near future.5
Stanfill is one of many professional athletes who suffers from permanent
disability as a result of repeated injuries sustained while playing professional
sports.6 Professional athletes face tremendous pressure to get back on the field
from coaches, management, and the players themselves.7 This can lead to
serious physical disabilities for elite athletes.
Magnifying the problem are growing conflicts of interest faced by the team
physicians who treat these athletes.8 Physicians confront dual loyalty problems
1. William Nack, The Wrecking Yard: As They Limp Into the Sunset, Retired NFL Players
Struggle with the Game’s Grim Legacy: A Lifetime of Disability and Pain, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
May 7, 2001, at 60, 68.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 69.
6. See Gene Wojciechowski & Chris Dufresne, Life Expectancy Low, Some Say: Football
Career is Taking its Toll on NFL’s Players, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1988, Part III (Sports), at 1
(discussing Los Angeles Times survey, which found that 78% of professional football players
surveyed suffered some permanent disability). Many of the findings of this 1988 study were
replicated by the NFL Players Association in its 2000 survey of players. See Gene Frenette & P.
Douglas Filaroski, Medicine and the NFL, an Uneasy Partnership, FLA. TIMES UNION, Dec. 15,
2002, at A-1.
7. This Paper primarily addresses external pressure on athletes to return to the playing
field, but we should be careful not to underestimate athletes’ internal drive to play even when
hurt. One often will hear athletes voice the adage, “no pain, no gain”—reflecting the belief that
some degree of suffering is necessary to achieve athletic glory. A powerful recent example is
Boston Red Sox hurler Curt Schilling, who pitched his team to the 2004 American League
Championship and World Series title despite a ruptured tendon-sheath seeping blood into his
shoe. See Tyler Kepner, Red Sox Erase 86 Years of Futility in 4 Games, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2004, at A1. Furthermore, society as a whole often looks upon individuals who have overcome
great pain as a marker of heroism. For example, we all admire the suffering endured by former
army POW Jessica Lynch and paralyzed actor Christopher Reeve, and many view them as heroes
precisely because of what they have undergone. See, e.g., James Dao, Private Lynch Comes Back
Home to a Celebration Fit for a Hero, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at A1; Douglas Martin,
Christopher Reeve, 52, Symbol of Courage, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A1.
8. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13 (“Team doctors are left to strike a
balance between the interest of the players and the team.”). In defining the term “conflict of
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stemming from both the employment relationship and marketing arrangements
they have entered into with their sports franchise employer. When physicians
are hired directly by a team to treat its players (and therefore answer to
management), there is often subtle or even overt pressure to return injured
athletes to the field prematurely in order to maximize the team’s chances of
winning.9 Furthermore, given the marketing edge and prestige associated with
being named the “official healthcare provider” for a major athletic franchise,
physician groups often compete with each other to offer these services for a
reduced fee or for free.10 As a result, medical decisions may be made that are
not in the best interest of the player and his health, but rather which are in the
short-run interests of the team. As the doctor’s duty to her patient becomes
compromised, players’ trust in the medical advice being offered by the team
physician slowly erodes.
This conflict of interest between team physicians and the athlete–patients
they treat must be remedied by aggressively implementing policies and
procedures that change the current relationship between healthcare providers,
teams, and their players. Part I of this Paper examines the various duties that a
team physician owes her athlete–patient. Part II details the nature of the
relationship between teams, physicians, and players, and Part III explains how
these relationships cause conflicts of interest to arise. Finally, Part IV outlines
policy solutions that would remedy the diverging interests that team doctors
face.11
I. DOCTOR’S DUTY TO HER PATIENT
Physicians operate under a number of professional codes and regulations
that delineate their professional responsibilities to their patients. The
American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics states that a
interest,” the line between potential and actual conflict of interest is a matter of some debate. See
MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 8–
9 (1993). As Rodwin points out, some only use the term “conflict of interest” to refer to
situations of tangible acts of disloyal behavior. Id. at 9. Similar to Rodwin’s definition, for the
purposes of this article, conflicts of interest refer to situations that have the capacity to cause
harm, rather than solely instances of actual harm. See id.
9. See Sigmund J. Solares, Preventing Medical Malpractice of Team Physicians in
Professional Sports: A Call for the Players Unions to Hire the Team Physicians in Professional
Sports, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 235, 236 (1997).
10. Nick DiCello, Note, No Pain, No Gain, No Compensation: Exploiting Professional
Athletes Through Substandard Medical Care Administered by Team Physicians, 49 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 507, 517 (2001); Twila Keim, Comment, Physicians for Professional Sports Teams: Health
Care Under the Pressure of Economic and Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
196, 215–16 (1999).
11. While this Paper focuses on all professional sports teams, football is prominently
featured in the discussions and anecdotes because it creates many serious injuries that have
become the source of disputes and litigation.
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physician’s paramount concern must be the well-being of her patient.12
Healthcare providers are “bound not to let any other interest interfere with that
of the patient in being cured.”13
Doctors are also bound by the requirements of the Hippocratic Oath.14 The
original version of the Oath stated that physicians must endeavor to prevent
“harm and injustice” to their patients.15 One modern version of the
Hippocratic Oath, the Oath of Lasagna, requires that doctors take all necessary
measures to heal the sick, while avoiding the “twin traps of overtreatment and
therapeutic nihilism.”16
Given the special risks that participation in sports presents, the AMA also
maintains distinct regulations for physicians who treat athletes. AMA Code of
Medical Ethics § 3.06 requires that physicians assist players in making
“informed decisions about their participation in amateur and professional
contact sports which entail risks of bodily injury.”17 A physician’s only
consideration should be the medical care of the participant—the desire of the
athlete, the team, or its fans to see the athlete back on the field should not be
controlling.18 The AMA also explicitly obliges physicians to avoid conflicts of
interest. AMA Code of Medical Ethics § 8.03 states that “[u]nder no
circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above the
welfare of their patients.”19 Moreover, any conflict between a physician’s
financial interest and her responsibility to the patient must be resolved to the
patient’s benefit.20
Finally, beyond professional regulation, healthcare providers face potential
tort liability for the medical services they render, and therefore must follow the
relevant standard of care in their treatment of athlete–patients.21 As Joseph
King has outlined, “[T]eam physician[s] should perform with the level of
knowledge, skill, and care that is expected of a reasonably competent medical
practitioner under similar circumstances, taking into account reasonable limits

12. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS xiv (2004–2005) (Preamble).
13. RODWIN, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on
Experimenting with Human Subjects, 1969 DAEDALUS 219, 238).
14. For a translation of the original Oath, see LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH:
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION (Henry E. Sigerist ed., 1943).
15. Id. at 3.
16. Barbara A. Gabriel, A Hippocratic Oath for Our Time, ASSOC’N OF AM. MED.
COLLEGES REP. (Sept. 2001), http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept2001/hippocrati
coath.htm.
17. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, § 3.06.
18. See id.
19. Id. § 8.03 (outlining conflict of interest rules).
20. Id.
21. See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 8.08 (1979).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

190

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:185

that have been placed on the scope of the physician’s undertaking.”22 Thus,
physicians who treat athletes must be cognizant of a host of relevant
professional regulations and common law standards that govern the medical
care they provide.
A.

Conflict of Interest Defined

While these professional and legal obligations may seem obvious, they are
increasingly threatened by conflicts of interest that arise between team
physicians and their athlete–patients today. In general, a conflict of interest is
considered to exist when competing duties cannot be resolved without
compromising known obligations.23 To rise to this level, physicians’ divergent
obligations must “compromise their independent judgment or their loyalty to
patients.”24 Others define a conflict of interest as existing when a subsystem
that is a component of a larger system deliberately enhances its interest to the
detriment of the whole.25 It is not necessary that an actual injury occur as a
result of a conflict of interest between a physician and her patient—rather, the
creation of the capacity to cause injury and the corresponding erosion of trust
between physicians and their patients is harm enough alone. When the
interests of doctors and patients are at odds, there is increased risk that the
physician may abuse, and eventually lose, the trust of her patient, further
jeopardizing healthcare decisions being made.
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS, PLAYERS, AND THE TEAM
A.

Employer–Employee Relationship Between Team and Physician

At the heart of the tension facing team physicians is the dual loyalty
problem created by their employment relationship with the sports franchise
that hires them. All professional sports teams provide for a physician to be
available to players, usually through team policy or a collective bargaining
agreement.26 These physicians may be general practitioners, but are often

22. Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 HOUS. L.
REV. 657, 692 (1981).
23. RODWIN, supra note 8, at 9.
24. Id.
25. E.g., Joseph M. McGuire, Conflict of Interest: Whose Interest? And What Conflict?, in
ETHICS, FREE ENTERPRISE, & PUBLIC POLICY 214, 216 (Richard T. De George & Joseph A.
Pichler eds., 1978).
26. See, e.g., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT
COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 2002–2008, art. XLIV (2002),
http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art44 [hereinafter NFL
CBA].
Each Club will have a board-certified orthopedic surgeon as one of its Club physicians.
The cost of medical services rendered by Club physicians will be the responsibility of the
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orthopedic surgeons.27 Within these arrangements, teams directly hire, fire,
and pay the doctors to treat their players.28 Thus, employee-physicians owe
allegiance to their employer-teams, while simultaneously owing a duty of
loyalty to the athlete–patients they treat on a daily basis.29 Notably, the AMA
requires that any contractual relationship entered into by physicians with teams
be free from lay interference in medical matters, and that a doctor’s primary
responsibility be to her patient.30 Nevertheless, team management often
intervenes in medical decision-making regarding its players, placing the
physician in an ethically compromised position.31 On the one hand, the
physician is under a legal and professional duty to provide medical services in
the best interests of the athlete–patient. On the other, team management has
hired that physician to serve the team’s interest, which usually includes getting
valuable athletes back onto the playing field sooner rather than later.32 It is not
uncommon, then, that team physicians make decisions that are influenced by
respective Clubs. If a Club physician advises a coach or other Club representative of a
player’s physical condition which adversely affects the player’s performance or health,
the physician will also advise the player. If such condition could be significantly
aggravated by continued performance, the physician will advise the player of such fact in
writing before the player is again allowed to perform on-field activity.
Id.
27. See id. (requiring every NFL team to have an orthopedic surgeon as one of its club
physicians); see also Matthew J. Mitten, Emerging Legal Issues in Sports Medicine: A Synthesis,
Summary, and Analysis, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 5, 10 (2002).
28. Mitten, supra note 27, at 8. Complicating these relationships are conflicts of interest that
arise when professional teams take bids from medical groups to be the “official” healthcare
provider for the team. See infra Part III.B.
29. Some have analogized these dual duties to the diverging interests that so-called
“company doctors” might have faced in the past—i.e., physicians who were employed by
companies to care for the firm’s employees. See, e.g., Roger S. Magnusson & Hayden Opie, HIV
and Hepatitis in Sports: An Australian Legal Framework for Resolving Hard Cases, 5 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 69, 101 (1995). While there may have been some conflict if management
wanted to see a sick employee back at work, the conflict facing company doctors is much more
muted than the dilemma facing team physicians. Team physicians must treat patients whose
injuries are directly caused by their line of work, unlike company doctors who primarily treated
employees for sicknesses unrelated to their job. Compounding the problem is that the “job” of an
athlete involves considerably greater risk to health than the risk that most any other company
imposes on its employees.
30. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, § 8.05.
31. See, e.g., ROB HUIZENGA, YOU’RE OKAY, IT’S JUST A BRUISE: A DOCTOR’S SIDELINE
SECRETS ABOUT PRO FOOTBALL’S MOST OUTRAGEOUS TEAM 166 (1994) (describing how Los
Angeles Raiders’ owner Al Davis sent a message to injured player Marcus Allen ordering him to
“take a shot” from the team doctor for his injury).
32. Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal
Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 129, 140 (1993). Of course, some teams
may “play it safe” and hold elite athletes out of competition until they are 100% certain that the
player’s injury has healed, but more often the pressure is to get star athletes back on the field
instead of keeping them in the training room.
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team management in ways contrary to the player’s best interests. In sum, the
dual loyalty of team physicians under the current employment structure is a
recipe for player distrust and skepticism regarding the medical advice being
offered by team doctors.33
In addition to these pressures from team management, physicians also face
pressure from coaches to get their players back on the field. In a deposition for
a medical malpractice claim by a player, former Jacksonville Jaguars’ head
coach Tom Coughlin candidly admitted that he “can and will exert as much
pressure on the player and the doctors to get the player [back] on the field.”34
Testimony in the case alleged that Coughlin would walk past injured players in
rehabilitation and say derisively, “Oh, look at the sick, lame and lazy.”35
Coaches know that winning is paramount to their success. As one former team
physician stated, “There is no loyalty except to winning. In the NFL, owners
and coaches can treat employees in ways that would immediately provoke a
successful lawsuit in any other business.”36
B.

Marketing Arrangements Between Teams and Healthcare Providers

Complicating the matter today is the emerging practice in sports medicine
of auctioning off the right to be a team’s “official” medical provider, hospital,
or physician-group.37 The privilege of being selected generally comes with the
right to advertise in one’s promotional materials that her group has been named
the official healthcare provider of a particular professional sports franchise.38
In return, the team is provided medical care for free or at reduced cost.39 These
entrepreneurial arrangements began in 1995 with the expansion of the NFL
into Jacksonville, Florida and Charlotte, North Carolina.40 The Carolina
Panthers’ winning bid went to a medical group, Carolinas Medical Center,
which was willing to gift the team $400,000 worth of medical supplies and
33. See, e.g., Angelo Cataldi & Glen Macnow, Team Doctors: A Crisis in Ethics: A Question
of Trust for Athletes, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 19, 1989, at 1-A (describing professional hockey
player Mike Robitaille’s fear and distrust toward his team doctor as a growing trend among
athletes).
34. Selena Roberts, Coughlin’s Biggest Risk is Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004, at D1
(detailing a malpractice cause of action brought by Jeff Novak against the Jacksonville Jaguars
and team physician Stephen Lucie).
35. Id. at D5.
36. PIERCE E. SCRANTON, JR., PLAYING HURT: TREATING AND EVALUATING THE
WARRIORS OF THE NFL 153 (2001).
37. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
38. Bill Pennington, Sports Turnaround: The Team Doctors Now Pay the Team, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1.
39. Id.
40. Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine: Eager to Hold on to Their Valuable Sideline Practices,
Team Doctors All Too Often Strive to Help the Club, Not Heal the Player, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 76, 84.
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equipment and further provide medical services at managed care rates.41 Soon
after the New York Yankees won the World Series in 1999, they began to offer
the right to be the official team hospital in advertising and marketing.42
Several hospitals, including the Yankees’ longtime healthcare provider,
declined to participate, fearing that these arrangements might undermine
medical care.43
Unfortunately for the state of sports medicine, these marketing agreements
provide significant benefits for team physicians, both in terms of clients and
prestige. Methodist Hospital, which provides medical services to the NFL’s
Houston Texans, found that their association with the Texans is the numberone driver of new calls from prospective patients.44 It is estimated that half of
the major sports teams in the United States now have some kind of financial or
marketing arrangement to provide medical services.45 Within a decade,
experts believe that number will reach 90%.46 From both the team’s and
provider’s perspective, these arrangements make sound financial sense. The
larger question, however, is at what cost to the athlete’s interest and to the
doctor–patient relationship do these entrepreneurial agreements come?
C. Team Doctors as Partial Owners of Sports Franchises
In addition to the previously outlined sources of conflicts arising in sports
medicine, there exists another, albeit rare, source of physician–patient tension:
team doctors who maintain an ownership interest in their team. The classic
example is Arthur Pappas, who served as both part owner and team physician
for the Boston Red Sox until his resignation in 2002.47 Pappas’ dual
relationship led to player and public criticism that he was compromising his

41. Alexander Wolff & Christian Stone, Scorecard: Hippocratic Oath?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 8, 1995, at 12, 12. This type of arrangement also highlights the conflicts
inherent in managed care medicine. Physicians are often paid a set capitated fee per patient up
front and then run the risk of providing excess care at their own expense. Furthermore, patients
must make it past primary care physician “gatekeepers” before they can be referred to a specialist.
Not surprisingly, patients often complain that their physicians are incentivized to shortchange
them in order to maximize their own profits. See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, Corralling
Kevorkian: Regulating Physician-Assisted Suicide in America, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 41, 72–
77 (1999) (discussing the potential impact of managed care medicine on the physician-assisted
suicide debate).
42. William Sherman, Hospitals Team Up with Yanks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2000, at
24.
43. Id.
44. Pennington, supra note 38, at D4.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., id. (quoting Dean Bonham of the Bonham Group, an organization that
negotiates and arranges sports sponsorship deals).
47. See Joe Giuliotti, Barrett Awarded $1.7M, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 26, 1995, at 101.
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athletes’ best interests for the short-term benefit of the team.48 Former pitcher
Butch Henry alleged that Pappas ordered him to play, despite a torn anterior
cruciate ligament (ACL) in his knee.49 Henry also claimed that players
throughout Major League Baseball were hesitant to play in Boston because of
the club’s reputation for inadequately caring for injured athletes.50 As
anecdotal evidence, Marty Barrett, former Red Sox second baseman, won a
$1.7 million dollar judgment against Pappas after alleging that he failed to
disclose the seriousness of Barrett’s torn ACL.51 In his suit, Barrett claimed
that Pappas placed team interests in front of Barrett’s health,52 clearing him to
play too quickly in the midst of the Red Sox’ 1989 pennant chase.53 Perhaps
the most damaging testimony came from former manager Joe Morgan, who
recalled a meeting between him and Pappas in which the latter directly
admitted, “[B]y the condition of [Barrett’s] knee, he would not have a long
career.”54 Barrett prevailed on his medical negligence cause of action, but U.S.
District Court Judge Nathaniel Gorton found that there was no direct evidence
of misplaced interest.55
III. THE TEAM PHYSICIAN’S DUAL LOYALTY TO THE EMPLOYER AND TO THE
ATHLETE–PATIENT POSES A SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST
A.

Employment Relationship

The fact that physicians are employees of the team whose athletes they
treat creates conflicts of interest that are difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy
ethically. When a team hires a medical provider, the purpose of that
employment relationship is to further the interests of the sports franchise. Not
surprisingly, the goal of team management is to run a successful business
organization, which generally means maximizing both wins and profit.56 With

48. See Phil O’Neill, Pappas Resigns Medical Role with Red Sox, WORCESTER TELEGRAM
& GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 2002, at D2.
49. Sean McAdam, Heaping Dose of Criticism Leaves Sox’ Pappas in Guarded Condition,
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Mar. 12, 1999, at D1.
50. Id.
51. See Giuliotti, supra note 47, at 101.
52. See Nocera, supra note 40, at 87.
53. See id. Unfortunately, doing so did little to change the Red Sox’ fortune, as they failed
to make the playoffs, finishing in third place in the American League East. See The Baseball
Archive Database: 1989 Major League Standings, http://www.baseball1.com/statistics/team/std1989.html.
54. Nocera, supra note 40, at 88.
55. Giuliotti, supra note 47, at 101.
56. See Hal Lancaster, Is Sports Just Another Business? One Veteran Says, ‘Yes, Mostly,’
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 17.
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some professional sports teams operating as publicly traded companies57 and
others considering the prospect of initial public offerings,58 the business nature
of professional sports is abundantly clear. As former Seattle Seahawks team
physician Pierce Scranton bluntly stated in his tell-all exposé, Playing Hurt,
“The balancing forces are the same in the NFL as in any other industry: fear
and greed.”59
The profit maximization pressures felt by team management are shared by
physicians as well, as most play an indirect role in the management of the team
by advising coaches regarding who is healthy and whom they should be
concerned about. For example, Dr. Scranton detailed his involvement in the
organization’s process of evaluating who should remain on the team and who
he felt was expendable.60 The fact that physicians are advising coaches about
team personnel intertwines doctors and management, and makes a candid
relationship between doctors and athletes nearly impossible. Players are
incentivized to withhold pertinent health information from the team physician
out of fear that the information will be used against them. Further
deteriorating the doctor–patient relationship is the reality that team physicians
may also be called upon to testify against their patients should a contract
dispute arise.61 In the NFL, when a player is released by his team because he
is physically unable to complete his contract, he may file a grievance with the
league.62 The team physician may then be required to testify against the
former player, a practice that is unheard of in any other doctor–patient
context.63
Unlike the team physician’s role as an employee in a profit-maximizing
venture, the traditional relationship between doctor and patient has very
different objectives and expectations. Athlete–patients assume that their
treating physician will exercise her best independent medical judgment and be
loyal to them in giving medical advice.64 The AMA Code of Medical Ethics
dictates that the patient has a right to be truthfully informed about his medical
57. See Brian R. Cheffins, Playing the Stock Market:”Going Public” and Professional Team
Sports, 24 J. CORP. L., 641, 642 (1999).
58. See Sam Walker, Yankees, Nets May Issue Stock After Merger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
1999, at B7.
59. SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 143.
60. See id. at 37.
61. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 316.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See RODWIN, supra note 8, at 8. If athletes did indeed possess full information about the
conflicts their treating physician faced, one would expect that the risks posed by the conflict
would be mitigated by athletes’ skepticism about any medical advice offered. While there is
growing awareness among athletes of the problem today, players in general would still like to
assume that the team physician is relatively loyal to them and aims to effectuate their best
medical interests.
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care, including the risks and benefits of treatment options.65 Patients are
entitled to be told of any potential conflicts of interest that their physician
faces.66 Patients also have a right to confidentiality that should not be
breached absent the patient’s consent.67 Unfortunately, these core elements of
the doctor–patient relationship do not exist in the doctor–player relationship.
Dr. Scranton opined that as a result of pressure from team management, “[t]he
conventional doctor–patient relationship is nonexistent [in sports medicine],
and the trust naturally fostered by such a relationship is consciously
undermined by the organization.”68 These sentiments are echoed by Dr. Rob
Huizenga, former team physician for the Los Angeles Raiders and past
president of the NFL Physicians Society.69 In You’re OK, It’s Just a Bruise,
Huizenga details his experience as a team physician and his eventual departure
due to poor medical treatment of players and inappropriate interference by
management.70 He reluctantly opined, “I thought I could be a team doctor and
rise above the potential game-day pressures and conflict of interest. . . . I was
wrong.”71 Such candid testimonials by physicians themselves underscore the
serious problems posed by the conflicts inherent in today’s employment
relationship between teams and physicians. Athletes can no longer reasonably
expect that their team doctor’s medical advice will be uninfluenced by strong
pressures from above.
B.

Marketing Arrangements Exacerbate the Problem

A disturbing escalation of the tension created by the employer–employee
relationship is the increasing use of innovative marketing arrangements
between medical groups and professional sports teams. When physicians bid
for the privilege of being named the “official” healthcare provider of a team (in
order to gain an advertising advantage on their competition), they face the
competing duties of their own financial interest in their agreement versus their
overarching commitment to their patients. Rather than receiving payment as
they normally would for providing medical services, they are often paying for
the opportunity to provide the services given the concomitant marketing
benefits attached. Such arrangements deepen the dual loyalty problems for
team physicians—the pressure to retain the prestigious agreement with the
sports franchise creates an incentive to ensure management is happy with the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, § 10.01.
Id.
Id.
SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 174.
See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 315–17.
See id. at 263–64.
Id. at 317.
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physician’s decision.72 Not surprisingly, this incentive conflicts with the
physician’s obligation to ensure the well-being of her patient.73
The rise of these marketing deals in recent years has led several team
physicians and medical ethicists to cry foul. Dr. Dan Brock, director of
Harvard Medical School’s Division of Medical Ethics, criticized the
arrangements as “unseemly” and lamented the “clear conflict of interest”
created.74 Dr. Andrew Bishop, physician for the Atlanta Falcons, threatened to
resign if the team entered a sponsorship agreement with a local hospital.75
Bishop worried, “The perception is that if this [physician] was so eager to do
this he’s willing to pay to do it, then he’s going to do whatever management
wants to keep the job he paid for.”76 In addition to physician concerns, players
have also expressed their dissatisfaction with these marketing agreements. The
chief operating officer of the Major League Baseball Players Association
pointedly stated, “Our players do not like this trend in medical-care agreements
one bit.”77 Quite reasonably, they believe it harms the trusting relationship
between players and doctors, and undermines the credibility of team
physicians.78
C. Evidence of the Conflict
Limited litigation data and empirical surveys of current and former
professional athletes illustrate the existence of serious conflicts of interest
faced by team physicians. Unfortunately, there are relatively few lawsuits by
professional athletes from which to garner information, primarily because the
exclusive remedy provisions contained in many state workers’ compensation
statutes bar such suits.79 Nevertheless, the survey results and litigation that do

72. See Scott Polsky, Comment, Winning Medicine: Professional Sports Team Doctors’
Conflicts of Interest, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 503, 515–19 (1998).
73. See id. at 519–20.
74. See Pennington, supra note 38, at D4.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. E.g., Hendy v. Losse, 819 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1991) (injured professional football player’s
medical malpractice action barred because workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for
injuries by co-employees). See generally DiCello, supra note 10, at 526–33 (discussing that
under workers’ compensation laws, employees (including professional athletes) are generally
prohibited from bringing suit against a fellow employee (e.g., team physicians) because the
state’s workers’ compensation system is the exclusive remedy for injuries that occur on the job).
There are limited exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ compensation,
including torts committed by independent contractors, intentional torts, fraud, and injuries that
fall under the “dual capacity” doctrine. See id. Additionally, a small number of states exclude
professional athletes from workers’ compensation. See id. at 529. However, for the most part,
workers’ compensation programs have worked to bar recovery for professional athletes for
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exist chronicle serious problems caused by conflicts of interest that must be
addressed if we are to restore athletes’ faith in the medical judgment being
rendered by their team physicians.
One of the first important steps in assessing the magnitude of the problem
was taken by the Los Angeles Times.80 Its study of all retired NFL players
provided a deeper understanding of the physical impact of playing professional
football. Shockingly, nearly four-fifths of players surveyed said they suffered
permanent physical disabilities directly related to their playing careers.81
Further, 60% of respondents believed that the NFL did not have their short- or
long-term interests in mind.82 Worse, over half said that their best interests
were at one point compromised by a team physician, and 43% would not have
chosen the team physician as their own personal doctor if they were given a
choice.83 The NFL Players Association survey of its members in 2000
confirmed these findings, as one of the players’ primary concerns was medical
treatment and their ability to initiate grievance procedures against team
physicians that they felt rendered inappropriate medical advice.84
In one of the first successful medical malpractice lawsuits by a player,
former San Francisco Forty Niner Charlie Krueger sued the team physician for
fraudulently concealing the extent of his injuries and giving him repeated
treatments to return him to the playing field.85 As a result, Krueger now
suffers from permanent disabilities, including severe arthritis and crippling
degenerative pain that has left him unable to perform simple tasks such as
standing, walking, or climbing stairs.86 After winning his case before the
California Court of Appeals, Krueger was awarded $2.3 million as
compensation for his injuries.87 At the time, it was the largest award ever
injuries due to negligent medical care by team physicians. See id. at 526. For further reading
regarding workers’ compensation laws affecting professional athletes, see Teresa Herbert, Are
Player Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 263–75 (2000); Mitten, supra
note 27, at 36–37.
80. See Wojciechowski & Dufresne, supra note 6, at 1; see also Frenette & Filaroski, supra
note 6, at A-13 (replicating many of the findings of the 1988 Los Angeles Times survey).
81. See Wojciechowski & Dufresne, supra note 6, at 1.
82. Id. at 13 (table of survey questions and responses).
83. Id.
84. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13 (including a team-by-team breakdown of
the percentage of players who believe their team’s medical care was good or better and the
percentage of players who believe it is important to institute mandatory second opinions).
85. See Krueger v. S.F. Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 580, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(depublished).
86. Jennifer Lynn Woodlief, The Trouble with Charlie, 9 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4 (1991).
87. Id. at 3; see Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (reversing, finding that the lower court
decision was not based on substantial evidence and that Krueger established the required elements
of his claim for fraudulent concealment of medical services). On remand from the California
Court of Appeals, the trial court awarded Krueger $66,000 in special damages and $2.3 million in
general damages. Woodlief, supra note 86, at 3. After the California Supreme Court denied
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against a professional sports team and the first time a player was successful in
suing his team on the grounds of inappropriate medical treatment.88 However,
the California Supreme Court denied review and decertified the Court of
Appeals opinion without issuing a written opinion.89 This removed the
decision as precedent and led to an out-of-court settlement, reportedly for
greater than $1 million.90 In the depublished Court of Appeals decision, the
judge noted, “[I]n its desire to keep [Krueger] on the playing field, [the team]
consciously failed to make full, meaningful disclosure to him respecting the
magnitude of the risk he took in continuing to play a violent contact sport with
a profoundly damaged left knee.”91
Another high-profile NFL case involved injuries sustained by Merril Hoge
while a fullback for the Chicago Bears.92 In 2000, Hoge was awarded $1.55
million for negligent treatment in response to a concussion that ended his
football career.93 A jury found that the doctor treating him did not properly
inform him of the dangers of returning to play too soon after an earlier
concussion.94 Hoge continued to play without knowledge of the risk and
suffered another concussion that led to the end of his playing career.95
Conflicts involving medical care rendered by team physicians are not
limited to the NFL, however. Dave Babych of the National Hockey League’s
Philadelphia Flyers fractured a bone in his left foot during a game in 1998.96
Unfortunately, it was never properly set and he was given pain killers that
allowed him to return to play too quickly, resulting in a career-ending injury.97
Babych was successful in his medical malpractice cause of action against the
team, winning a jury verdict of $1.37 million, but did not prevail on his charge
of fraud against the team physician.98

further review of the case and ordered the California Court of Appeals decision decertified and
unpublished without a written opinion, Krueger settled with the team for between $1 million and
$1.5 million. Id.
88. Woodlief, supra note 86, at 3.
89. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
90. Woodlief, supra note 86, at 3.
91. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
92. See Mitten, supra note 27, at 28.
93. Id. at 28–29.
94. Id.
95. See id. Unfortunately, a new trial had to be ordered on appeal because Hoge’s trial
attorney violated discovery rules by failing to provide the defendant with a letter from one of
Hoge’s doctors. Id. at 29; see also $1.55M Verdict Against a Football Doctor Reversed, NAT’L
L.J., Apr. 2, 2001, at A12.
96. Treatment Cut Hockey Player’s Career Short, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 18, 2002, at B2.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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One might reasonably query why athletes continue to suit up knowing that
they are injured. In addition to strong personal drive to return to the game,99
players face severe penalties for refusing to play when they have been cleared
medically.100 Hakeem Olajuwon was suspended by the NBA’s Houston
Rockets for refusing to play injured after doctors gave him approval to do
so.101 The team physician claimed his injury was healed, while Olajuwon
believed the opposite to be the case.102 Olajuwon further alleged that the
physician was influenced by the loyalty he owed to team management, while
the team countered that Olajuwon’s refusal was just a ploy in his contract
negotiations.103 In addition to possible suspensions or fines, players who resist
playing hurt due to pain also face scrutiny from management and coaches.
Jacksonville Jaguars head coach Tom Coughlin was heard to call injured
athletes “[t]he sick, lame and lazy.”104 Dr. Huizenga of the L.A. Raiders
detailed the constant pressure that owner Al Davis placed on running back
Marcus Allen to take shots in order to return to the field despite his injuries and
pain.105 This pressure is difficult to resist for any player, especially those who
lack the star status of Allen and risk being released from their team if they do
not follow the doctor’s or coach’s orders.
The scope of conflicts due to physicians’ dual loyalty to both the athlete–
patient and to the team includes not only treatment of player injuries, but also
pain management. One of the earliest player lawsuits on this matter was
brought by Dick Butkus, former linebacker for the Chicago Bears.106 Butkus
alleged that the weekly pain-killing injections he received for a knee injury
were administered without adequate informed consent regarding the
complications.107 He settled his lawsuit for $600,000 in 1976 and still suffers
from permanent injuries today as a result of his treatment.108 In a 1978 lawsuit
against the team physician for the Portland Trailblazers, Bill Walton similarly
alleged that the doctor had injected heavy painkillers into his injured feet
before games and failed to inform him of the risks associated with continuing

99. This attitude is summed up by the often-cited battle cry, “no pain, no gain.” Virtually all
professional athletes would prefer to play rather than sit in the trainer’s room. A prominent recent
example is the pain endured by Boston Red Sox pitcher Curt Schilling as he carried his team to
the American League Pennant and World Series title despite playing with a torn tendon-sheath in
his ankle. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. See Olajuwon Seeks Way to Protest Suspension, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at 105.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Roberts, supra note 34, at D5.
105. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 165–69.
106. Polsky, supra note 72, at 521.
107. Id.
108. Nocera, supra note 40, at 84.
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to play.109 Moreover, in response to concerns about the long-term effects of
heavy painkillers in treating injuries, the Cincinnati Bengals recently stopped
using such medications on the field.110 The common sense rationale for the
decision was that using these masking agents during a game could conceal
serious injury that was in need of treatment.111 Simply killing the pain can lead
to a player further injuring himself, jeopardizing his long-term health and
career.
In addition to survey data and litigation, there is further evidence of player
concern regarding decisions made by team physicians.112 Quite tellingly,
players are increasingly taking medical care into their own hands. They are
seeking second opinions more often, and all major players’ unions are now
encouraging and helping to facilitate the practice.113 In fact, the NFL Players
Association website today posts a list of doctors who are available to render
second opinions for players on every team.114 The most recent Major League
Baseball and National Football League collective bargaining agreements both
provide that players have the “right” to second medical opinions.115 The NFL
Players Union has also attempted to change their collective bargaining
agreement to provide for greater independence to team physicians.116 Some
players are eschewing team doctors entirely—Barry Bonds, for instance, hires

109. Polsky, supra note 72, at 521; Nocera, supra note 40, at 84. The case settled out of
court. Nocera, supra note 40, at 84.
110. Ken Gordon, Bengals Trainer Disdains Needle and Damage Done, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 2002, at 2D.
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., Lotysz v. Montgomery, 766 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). In
Lotysz’s medical malpractice action against team physicians, amicus briefs were filed in Lotysz’s
favor by the National Football League Players Association, Major League Baseball Players
Association, National Basketball Players Association, National Hockey League Players
Association, and Professional Hockey Players Association. Id.
113. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13.
114. NFL
PLAYERS
ASSOCIATION
SECOND
OPINION
LISTING
(2005),
http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=Second+Opinions.
115. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 2003–2006 BASIC AGREEMENT
45–46, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [hereinafter MLBPA BASIC
AGREEMENT] (requiring at Article XIII(D) that teams provide players with an accepted list of
specialists that they may see as part of their contract); NFL CBA, supra note 26, at art. XLIV
(permitting a player to seek a second opinion; but requiring the player to consult the team
physician prior to doing so, and entitling the team physician to issue her own report concerning
the findings of the second physician).
116. Gene Wojciechowski & Chris Dufresne, Delicate Procedures: NFL Team Physicians
Must Provide Proper Care to Injured Players and Please Management at Same Time, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 1988, Part III (Sports), at 12.
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his own trainer to help with his back pain instead of relying on the San
Francisco Giants’ staff of medical care providers.117
Moreover, doctors themselves have expressed concern over management
involvement in decisions regarding player care. Dr. Huizenga, former
president of the NFL Physicians Society, has aggressively argued that steps
must be taken to remove management pressures on medical decisions.118 Dr.
Michael Lawhon, team doctor for the Cincinnati Reds, resigned from the
organization in 1991 saying that he could not “continue to engage in a situation
that has a front office which does not consider the medical team and its
players’ health a priority.”119 Lawhon urges that reforms need to be made to
combat “a lack of support and honesty from the front office, continued secondguessing and misleading reports about injuries.”120 Dr. Arthur Caplan, director
of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Bioethics, also laments the dual
loyalty problems confronted by team physicians and advocates for change.121
Caplan argues that physicians cannot meet their obligation to look after the
welfare of their patients when their interests are also inextricably linked to the
needs of their employer and the franchise.122 John Cadigan, former team
physician for the New England Patriots, decries the erosion of trust that has
resulted from players viewing doctors as part of the team’s management, rather
than as advocates for the athlete’s best medical interests.123 He proposes
fundamental alterations to the employment relationship between teams and
doctors as a sensible response to today’s conflicts.124
Finally, mounting evidence exists that due to the pressures that team
physicians face, they are increasingly engaging in unethical behavior when it
comes to designating players eligible for injured reserve.125 Because the NFL
limits the number of players who can remain on their team’s active roster,
physicians sometimes coach athletes to fake injuries.126 By doing so, the

117. See Ken Daley, A Bonds Primer: How He’s Making History: Several Factors Propelling
the Drive for 70, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2001, at 5B.
118. See HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 316–17.
119. Doctor for Reds Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1991, at B19.
120. Id. For example, another physician, Dr. Arthur Caplan, urges that Miranda-style
warnings disclosing the conflicts that doctors face be given to athlete–patients. See infra notes
151–52 and accompanying text.
121. Sabin Russell, Rice’s Injury Puts Spotlight on Team Doctors: Pressure to Win Conflicts
with Players’ Need to Heal, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1997, at A1.
122. See id. at A8. Caplan adds that it is highly unusual for doctors to practice medicine in
the face of such significant economic pressures adverse to independent medical judgment. Id.
123. See Hal Habib, When Injuries Rob Athletes, Who’s to Blame?, PALM BEACH POST, June
16, 2002, at 1C.
124. See id. at 14C; see also infra Part IV.A (recommending that physicians be hired by the
league rather than by individual teams).
125. See, e.g., SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 54–55.
126. See id.
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player can be placed on injured reserve and avoid being released from the
team.127 One team referred to the practice as providing “rookie scholarships,”
under which a player would fake an injury, receive his full salary, and then
attempt to make the team the following season.128 Team doctors are pressured
to enable this fraudulent practice by pretending to treat the uninjured player.
As a rationalization, one team physician clearly revealed the conflict of interest
he faced, stating: “We were hired to protect the players’ health and to
[simultaneously] look out for the team’s interests, and that’s exactly what we
Fortunately, the NFL has attempted to curtail these rookie
did.”129
scholarships in recent years by limiting the number of players permitted on
injured reserve.130 Nevertheless, if a physician were to coach a patient to feign
an injury in any other context (such as a court trial), she would be in outright
violation of AMA medical ethics guidelines and face serious consequences.131
Again, however, we witness the toll of the employment conflicts on team
doctors, pressuring them to compromise medical ethics in order to achieve the
goals of their employer.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A.

Eliminate the Team Physician Entirely and Hire Doctors Through the
League or Players Union

Given the perils and incentives created by the conflicts of interest detailed
above, we must consider policy options that would mitigate or remove the
problem entirely. Fundamentally restructuring the current employment
relationship between teams, physicians, and players is in the best interest of all
three parties. Players would benefit because they would know their best
interests were now being held paramount by their treating physician, which in
turn would increase their confidence and trust in the medical advice being
offered. Players could further expect to be provided with complete
information about the potential complications of treatment options, and at the
same time, would be more willing to reveal all information relevant in treating
them.132 Ideally, this would lead to an overall improvement in long-term

127. See id.
128. HUIZENGA, supra note 31, at 199.
129. SCRANTON, supra note 36, at 55.
130. See id.
131. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 12, at xiv (Preamble) (“A
physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional interactions,
and strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or
deception, to appropriate entities.”).
132. Under the current system, one might reasonably speculate that if a player knows his
doctor is advising his coach on which athletes he thinks can perform well versus those he feels
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player health and the doctor–patient relationship. Doctors would benefit from
an employment restructuring because they would no longer be placed in the
ethically uncomfortable situation of being pressured by management to make
medical decisions that could be adverse to a player’s best interests. Moreover,
physicians may even be able to lower their malpractice costs by avoiding
lawsuits that allege fraudulent medical care on the theory that the doctor’s
loyalty was not with the player.133 Finally, sports franchises would reap longterm benefits because their players would be in better health and ideally be
able to extend their playing careers.134
The most obvious method to fundamentally change the physician’s
employment relationship would be to no longer have teams hire physicians.
The players’ unions and the professional sports leagues are the most obvious
organizations that could take over this responsibility.135 Both players136 and
physicians137 have reasonably proposed such a move. Players’ unions only
represent the interest of the athletes that comprise their membership. Thus,
physicians hired by the union would owe their loyalty solely to the players they
treat. In this manner, a far more traditional doctor–patient relationship would
be created in which an athlete could trust that his physician had only his wellbeing at heart.138 Today’s dual loyalty that physicians owe to both players and
organizations—and the corresponding conflict of interest created—would be
eliminated. Furthermore, if the players’ union hired physicians, then they
could be categorized as independent contractors, which would in turn remove
workers’ compensation law as the exclusive remedy for injuries.139 Players
would be permitted to bring negligence suits for medical malpractice against

cannot, that player would be apt to conceal adverse health information for fear of losing playing
time.
133. See supra notes 85–98 and accompanying text (detailing malpractice litigation against
team physicians).
134. Obviously, this is a benefit only if teams care about the long-run horizon. Presumably, if
they did, they might institute some of the reforms suggested in this Paper on their own. The fact
that teams have generally not done so may be evidence that providing healthcare free from
conflicts of interest may indeed be less than profit maximizing.
135. See Solares, supra note 9, at 249–53; Justin P. Caldarone, Comment, Professional Team
Doctors: Money, Prestige, and Ethical Dilemmas, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 131, 150 (2002); DiCello,
supra note 10, at 534–35.
136. See Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13.
137. See Habib, supra note 123, at 14C (noting that former team physician for the New
England Patriots recommended that the league be responsible for hiring team physicians, rather
than individual teams).
138. See Herbert, supra note 79, at 257–58.
139. Id. at 275.
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the doctors they hire, thereby incentivizing physicians to offer the best medical
care and advice possible.140
The collective bargaining agreements for the professional players’ unions
provide an excellent vehicle to create these new relationships between players
and their physicians. The NFL collective bargaining agreement expires in
2007,141 the NBA’s expired after the 2005 season,142 and the Major League
Baseball collective bargaining agreement is set to end in December of 2006.143
Through these collective bargaining negotiations, players’ unions have the ripe
opportunity to alleviate the longstanding tension between players and doctors
and to remove the conflict of interest that team physicians confront.144 In fact,
leaders of the NFL Players Union have already expressed a desire to discuss
long-term consequences of medical decisions in their next collective
bargaining agreement.145 The Union has understandably made healthcare a
priority concern after its 2000 survey revealed concerns with medical care by
team physicians and demonstrated that players strongly believe that second
medical opinions should be mandatory.146 The Union is currently considering
what proactive steps can be taken, including instituting a grievance procedure
against doctors.147 Of course, the superior option would be to end the
grievances once and for all.
Besides using the collective bargaining process, a second option to
restructure the employment relationship of team physicians would be to require
the professional sports league itself to hire the doctors rather than its players

140. Cf. Lotysz v. Montgomery, 766 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Hendy v. Losse,
819 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1991) (prohibiting negligence claims of professional athletes from
proceeding because workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for those injured by a coemployee physician acting in the scope of employment).
141. Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13.
142. NBA Extends Deal with Players Union, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 2003, at E2. The NBA
recently reached a new collective bargaining agreement with players that was ratified this
summer. See Associated Press News Service, League, Players Get New CBA Done Before
Lockout, CBS SPORTSLINE.COM, June 21, 2005, http://cbs.sportsline.com/nba/story/8584282.
While salary cap and revenue sharing remained dominant issues, little was done to remedy
conflicts of interest faced by team physicians. See id.
143. See MLBPA BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 115, at 119. At the time this Paper was
authored, the National Hockey League was under a lockout due to disputes over its collective
bargaining agreement. See Joe Lapointe, N.H.L. and Union Reject Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2004, at D6.
144. See Pennington, supra note 38, at A1 (describing the longstanding tension between
players of professional sports teams and team doctors because of the employment relationship
between the doctor and the team). Of course, some may possess a less optimistic view of the
ability of labor unions to effectuate players’ interests in this regard, especially if leadership is
“captured” by league or team management.
145. Frenette & Filaroski, supra note 6, at A-13.
146. See id.
147. Id.
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union.148 John Cadigan of the New England Patriots recently called for such a
reform, proposing that the NFL hire doctors directly rather than the teams.149
This alternative would similarly remove the pressures placed by management
on physicians and would return the distorted doctor–athlete relationship back
to the realm of a more traditional doctor–patient relationship.150 Ultimately,
however, players might still be skeptical of league involvement in light of the
close relationship between leagues and the individual teams that comprise
them. If this is a significant concern, having the players’ union hire physicians
directly would be the superior reform to eliminate both actual and perceived
conflicts of interest.
B.

Mandatory Conflict Disclosure

If a radical employment change proves too difficult to negotiate, team
doctors should at the very least be required by law and league policy to
affirmatively disclose their financial relationships and conflicts of interest to
players.151 This disclosure would include any ownership interests held by the
physician, the products endorsed by the team or her medical group, and
whether the physician made contributions to the team in exchange for being
named the “official” healthcare provider.152 The purpose of mandating conflict
disclosure would be to inform athletes of all relevant information regarding
their healthcare choices and to promote trust and openness in what many see as
a damaged relationship.
Dr. Arthur Caplan of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Bioethics
has expanded upon this disclosure principle. In light of the team physician’s
conflict of interest, Caplan believes there should be a “Miranda-style warning
[given] to every player informing him that he not only has the right but the
obligation to get his own personal physician.”153 He added that “[n]o
professional athlete should ever have to depend solely on the team doctor for
his medical treatment.”154
148. See DiCello, supra note 10, at 535.
149. Habib, supra note 123, at 14C.
150. See id.
151. See Keim, supra note 10, at 223–24.
152. See id.
153. Wolff & Stone, supra note 41, at 12 (referencing the Supreme Court ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requiring that police inform arrestees of certain rights before
questioning) (emphasis added). An interesting analogy could be made in the attorney–client
privilege context. When a lawyer is hired by a corporation to represent the organization, she is
required to disclose to individual corporate officers that she represents them in their capacity as
representatives of the corporation (i.e., not as individuals), and that in litigation between the two,
none of what is said is privileged. See Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “NonClients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney–Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other
Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 678 (1994).
154. Wolff & Stone, supra note 41, at 12.
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While such a warning would promote candor and be a step in the right
direction, the mere existence of mandatory disclosures would not remove the
underlying conflict of interest problem.
A warning would directly
acknowledge the issue and raise athletes’ awareness, but would not implement
the fundamental change in the physician’s employment relationship necessary
to remove the divergence of interests that she must satisfy.155
C. Physician Agreements to Assert Independence
Some sports medicine followers have proposed that physicians enter into
agreements with team management under which they explicitly assert their
authority to make decisions free from team interference.156 This type of
agreement would ensure that the physician’s relationship with the franchise is
purely professional, and that the doctor was not considered “part of the
team.”157 Moreover, such agreements should include the elimination of
incentives witnessed today for team physicians based on a successful season,
such as the championship rings and financial bonuses based on wins.158 These
agreements must also prohibit physicians from being involved in questionable
behavior such as inappropriately placing players on injured reserve.159 If such
contracts could be reached, they might mitigate the concern that physicians
who are emotionally or financially invested in the team might lose their
objectivity when making medical decisions.160
However, much like proposed “Miranda warnings” to players, this
prophylactic measure would not fundamentally alter the physician’s
relationship to the team in such a way as to remove the conflict of interest.
Even if these agreements existed, the potential for implicit interference from
management in daily medical decisions would create the same dual loyalty
problems for doctors as those seen today. Furthermore, the growing
prevalence of marketing agreements between teams and their medical
providers—under which physicians pay significant sums of money for the
privilege of providing healthcare services—makes it unlikely that physicians
possess the bargaining clout necessary to assert their independence and their
complete control over medical decisions affecting athletes.161

155. There is additional cause to be skeptical of the effect that mandatory disclosures would
have. In the criminal law context, for example, studies have shown that Miranda warnings have
had relatively little inhibiting effect on suspects’ willingness to talk to the police. See Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456 (1987).
156. See Keim, supra note 10, at 220–21; Caldarone, supra note 135, at 150.
157. See Caldarone, supra note 135, at 150.
158. Id.; DiCello, supra note 10, at 535.
159. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text; see also Polsky, supra note 72, at 526.
160. See Caldarone, supra note 135, at 150–51.
161. See Polsky, supra note 72, at 525.
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D. Ban Advertising of Physicians’ Relationship with Teams
The dramatic rise of marketing arrangements between teams and physician
groups over the last decade leads a reasonable mind to conclude that the
primary value of being named a team’s official healthcare provider is the
public relations benefit, not the compensation received for rendering medical
services. In turn, doctors may become so preoccupied with preserving the
marketing edge associated with being a team’s official provider that their
medical care decisions suffer.162 One potential method of alleviating this
growing problem (short of the more fundamental solutions above) would
simply be to ban advertising that highlights physicians’ relationships with
teams. If the marketing edge that physician groups now enjoy was strictly
prevented by league policy, doctors would no longer engage in bidding wars to
win the right to service athletes at below-market rates (or for free). Moreover,
their healthcare advice and decision-making would not be influenced by the
pressure to keep the position as a way of attracting future clients. Thus, merely
limiting the “PR” use of having a healthcare contract with a team would go a
long way towards eliminating some conflicts that physicians face.
E.

Modify Workers’ Compensation Laws

Finally, some critics of the current legal liability regime (or lack thereof)
support the notion that workers’ compensation statutes should be reconsidered
to meet the goals that they were originally created to satisfy.163 Traditionally,
these statutes offered protections to employees injured on the job that they
might not otherwise be able to negotiate or receive on their own. In the
professional sports context, however, they serve primarily to shield teams and
their physicians from medical malpractice liability while simultaneously
offering dramatically inadequate compensation to reimburse an injured player
for his expected loss.164 By modifying these statutes to exempt professional
sports franchises, athlete-employees would regain the necessary leverage
afforded by the threat of litigation against team physicians who do not hold the
player’s interest first and foremost in their healthcare decisions.165 In this
manner, the spirit of workers’ compensation laws—that employees be
adequately compensated for their injuries—would be satisfied, and teams and

162. See Pennington, supra note 38, at D4 (discussing Dr. Andrew Bishop’s concern that “if
this [physician] was so eager to do this he’s willing to pay to do it, then he’s going to do whatever
management wants to keep the job he paid for”) (emphasis added).
163. See Herbert, supra note 79, at 276–77; Michael Landis, The Team Physician: An
Analysis of the Causes of Action, Conflicts, Defenses and Improvements, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 157 (2003).
164. See Herbert, supra note 79, at 276.
165. See id. at 276–77.
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their physicians would no longer be able to hide under the shield of legislation
that was never intended to deprive athletes of just compensation.166
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, it has become increasingly clear that team physicians in
professional sports face serious conflicts of interest created by their competing
loyalties to both the athlete–patient that they treat and to the team that employs
them. The conflict is compounded by the recent rise of marketing agreements
whereby physician groups pay significant sums of money in order to have the
right to be designated the official healthcare provider of a prestigious sports
franchise. In response, professional sports leagues and their players must
adopt measures that would alleviate the worsening conflicts and enhance
protections for athlete–patients. Most fundamentally, the character of the
current employment relationship between teams and their physicians must be
drastically altered by requiring doctors be hired directly by the players’ union
or by the league itself. In this manner, the dual loyalty problem that team
physicians face today (i.e., Do they serve the interests of the team which
employs them or the welfare of the player-patient they treat?) would be
removed. Physicians could then resume a more traditional and trusting doctor–
patient relationship with the athletes they see, and players’ confidence in the
medical decisions being rendered would rise significantly. If such a change
proves politically impossible to institute, at the very least physicians should be
required to disclose the conflicts of interest they face to their athlete–patients.
In addition, reputable physician groups should insist on negotiating
healthcare provision agreements that stress the independence of their medical
judgment from the other interests being sought by team management.
Moreover, banning the ability of physicians to advertise their affiliation with a
sports franchise would substantially cut down on the willingness of medical
groups to defer to team management simply to preserve the “PR” benefit of
their relationship. Finally, state legislatures might consider amending workers
compensation statutes to remove coverage of professional sports teams,
because in this unique arena, such laws actually work to hurt the employee
(athlete) that they were originally intended to protect. In the final analysis, I
believe the best hope lies with players and their league to use the collective
bargaining process to reform physicians’ employment relationship with teams,
and to ensure that the medical care being provided to athletes who risk serious

166. See id. However, since workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for most
workplace injuries, many observers are not convinced that there is a clear public policy rationale
justifying a special exception solely for the benefit of professional athletes. Moreover, if the
league or players union hired doctors directly, they could hire physicians as independent
contractors, which would remove the problem of workers’ compensation exclusive remedy
provisions. See id. at 276.
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injury on a daily basis is never again compromised in the interest of financial
gain.

